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Preface 
This paper deals with the financing of Islamist terrorist groups in the Middle East. It is 
these groups that have in the past decade become the center of terrorist activity in the 
region and elsewhere in the world. Furthermore, we can trace in the last two to three 
years a shift of Islamist terrorist influence from the Middle East to Central and 
Southern Asia. This shift is the result of several main factors. Among these, we can 
cite the fall of the Soviet Union and the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan; the Oslo Accord 
and the expected process of reconciliation between Israel and the Palestinians; the rise 
of national and nationalistic feelings in Southern Europe and the Balkan; and better 
cooperation of Middle Eastern countries in countering terrorism, even between the 
Israeli and Palestinian security services. All this has caused a re-centering of Islamist 
terrorist activity from the heart of the Middle East eastward, toward the Balkans—
Bosnia, Albania, and Kossovo; toward the Caucasus—Chechnya and Daghastan; and 
lastly toward Asia—Uzbekistan, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. There is 
kind of national-Islamist terrorism even in Xinjiang in Western China, carried out by 
Uighur nationalists and Islamists.  
 
This shift is part of another process of the globalization of the Islamist struggle.
1 But, 
to date, this shift in the focus and axis of Islamist terrorism has not changed one 
important fact: the ideologies, cultural influence and religious justification for this 
kind of terrorism still emanate from the Middle East and the Arab World. As long we 
are facing Islamist terrorism, the Arab Muslim World remains the source of what we 
may call the “Islamist radical culture.” Two of the most prominent phenomena of the 
1990s are ample evidence of this: the phenomenon of the “Afghan Alumni”/ Afghan 
Arabs” on one hand, and the spread of Islamist Suicide terrorism as a religiously 
legitimate Modus Operandi, from Lebanon and Israel to Turkey and—this last year to 
Chechnya and to Kashmir.  
 
This paper does not deal with Islam or Islamic groups in general, nor does it present 
Islam or Muslims as violent. It examines the views and perceptions of radical Islamist 
terrorist groups towards Western culture and the way in which these groups present 
                                                  
1 On the most recent processes of the globalization of terrorism, see: Bruce Hoffman, “Change and 
continuity in Terrorism”, paper presented at Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the prevention 
of Terrorism, April 2000. www.mipt.org/hoffman-ctb.html    2
this confrontation as a clash of civilizations or Islam vs. the West, and primarily how 
this affects their financing. For this reason, this paper uses the term “Islamists” or 
“Islamist terrorist groups.” This term applies only to those Islamic groups that use 
radical misinterpretation of Islam in order to portray the religious duty of Jihad as 
meaning the use of violence and indiscriminate terrorism against civilians.  
 
Introduction 
Financing and fund-raising are difficult topics for research
2 when dealing with 
organizations in general, to say nothing of clandestine ones. The tendency of both the 
individual and community is to keep this issue private, far from public eyes. Dealing 
with clandestine groups is naturally much more difficult, and in the case of Islamist 
terrorist groups, perhaps the most difficult of all.
3 These groups are in many cases 
unique, compared to other kinds of known old or contemporary terrorist groups, such 
as nationalists, Marxists, or Anarchists. This uniqueness is the consequence of two 
main factors.  
 
One is the Islamic religious element in which charity is one of the most important 
duties and is used as the primary means to disguise financial activity. The other is the 
relatively widespread support gained by Islamic movements, groups and organizations 
for political, social, or cultural reasons. Above all, there is the fact that these are 
religious groups, or at least pass themselves off as such. This is of great benefit in a 
society in which Islam is deeply rooted and highly respected among the vast majority 
of the Arab and Muslim World.  
 
This religious element is most important in the case of the financing of terrorist 
groups. In recent years there has been a decline in the sponsoring of terrorism by 
states, as pointed out in the 1999 report, “Patterns of Global Terrorism” published 
annually by the US State Department.
4 What this means is that public support for 
terrorist groups has become the most essential element in fund-raising and the main 
source of finances. Indeed, contrary to what many might think, public fund-raising 
from individuals is the most important element in the finance of many institutes, 
associations and public organizations. This has been shown by researches and surveys 
in the U.S. We should therefore focus on this point too with regard to the finance of 
terrorist groups in the Middle East.  
                                                  
2   There were just few academic articles published on the issue. The best of them up till now is - James 
Adams, "The financing of Terror", in P. Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (eds), Contemporary Research on 
Terrorism (Aberdeen, University Press, 1987). Most of the researches were dealing with the IRA and Irish 
terror groups. See: John Horgan and Max Taylor, "Playing the "Green Card" - Financing the Provisional 
IRA", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 11, No. 2 (summer 1999), pp. 1-38. A good journalist survey 
of the financing of Islamist groups was published lately in English: Richard Labeviere, Dollars for Terror: 
The United States and Islam (New York, Algora Publishing, 2000). Translated from French (Les Dollars de 
la Terror) by Martin DeMers.  
3 It should be noted that even in the Patterns of Global Terrorism, the annual report of the US State 
Department, there is no serious analysis of the issue of financing terrorism. The issue is also relatively not 
dealt with in the Arab Media in the Middle East. An outstanding example of openness in the Arab press is 
an article of `Abd al-Rahman al-Rashid,  Arab News (Saudi Arabia), 11 October 1998. 
4 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, Introduction. 
www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/intro.html    3
Sources of the “Islamist Radical Culture” 
The public support for such Islamist terrorist groups, so vital to their success and their 
financial prospects, is the consequence of four social and psychological factors 
underlying the Islamic social-political renaissance: 
 
1.  Islamic and Islamist movements and groups have succeeded in the past three 
decades in planting in Arab and Muslim societies the notion of a kind of global 
cultural war, in which they confront a global conspiracy against Islam as a 
religion, culture and way of life. Thus, concepts synonymous in the Western 
political culture with terrorism and political violence are now viewed by many 
in the Islamic world to be Islamic religious duties. Such concepts include 
Jihad, Takfir (refutation),  Istishhad (Martyrdom, including by suicide), and 
Shahid (Martyr). The central notion, common to most of the Islamic 
movements and groups—those that carry out terrorism and political violence, 
and those that justify it and feed the atmosphere that promotes such activity—
is that of being in a state of siege which calls for self defense. To the believers 
in this concept, the confrontation justifies the use of all means—particularly 
when these means are given religious legitimacy. 
  
2.  Many of the Islamist and Islamic movements and groups have succeeded in 
convincing many in the Muslim world that they represent the true 
contemporary interpretation of Islam. Moreover, most of these groups 
developed out of the perceived need to return to the earliest fundamental 
sources of Islam. Thus, they based their views on Islamic scholars like Ibn 
Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyyah of the Middle ages, and Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab of the 
18
th Century, who were leading fundamentalist religious scholars, as well as 
the most unyielding.  
 
The success of the Islamist movements lies in the basic diversity of Islam. 
However it also owes much to the lack of a single Islamic center that enjoys the 
confidence of the vast majority of the Muslim World on one hand, and the control 
of the modern secular regimes in the Arab and Muslim World over the religious 
establishments, on the other. Those establishments are viewed by large parts of 
public as servants and puppets of the secular state (`Ulama’ al-Salatin), whose 
interpretations and rulings conform to the interests of the state. Thus, Islamic and 
Islamist groups and individuals have become the spiritual guides of quite a large 
Islamic population, and maintain a great deal of power and influence.  
 
3.  Most of the Islamic movements and groups, primarily those that emerged from 
the 1960s and after, present the Arab and Muslim regimes—and in some cases 
rightfully—as symbols of arbitrary oppression and the distortion of the social 
justice that is rooted in Islam. Thus, they instill bring their followers to 
sympathize with and support those who present themselves as the protectors of 
the weaker elements of society. Thus, in many cases they manage to recruit to 
their side elements of social, political, cultural and economic protest against 
various Arab and Muslim regimes. These elements also see themselves as   4
standing against the alleged global enemies and conspirators: The United 
States, Israel, the Jews, Western “Crusader” heretic culture, etc.  
 
At the base of this phenomenon lies the inability of large sections of the Muslim 
public to cope with the technological, cultural, or economic aspects of Western 
modernization. This has brought about the tendency to blame the secular cultures 
and ideologies that have given rise to these regimes on one hand, and to find 
salvation in the return to Islam and its glorious past—a kind of “Messianism” that 
gives hope for a better future, on the other. Since Orthodox Islam is identified 
with the Islamic establishments of the modern nationalist secular—sometimes 
even revolutionary and socialist—states, the support was given to those who 
represented the opposite culture: the activist and radical alternative that stands 
against the state.  
 
4.  The Islamic social-political revival, particularly since the 1960s, is linked both 
to social changes in the Arab and Muslim World, and to the formation of an 
educated middle class in different countries. This middle class has in part 
distanced itself from the Western secular modernization and the institutions of 
the modern state: the military, government administration, social and economic 
institutions controlled by the state, the public media, etc. Another part of this 
class, mainly professionals with respected professions such as physicians, 
lawyers, pharmacists, engineers, academic scholars, or merchants who have 
suffered from the tendency to nationalize the economy by the state, have found 
in the Islam propounded by modern Islamist trends the solution for their 
problems. This process created quite a large and highly educated group of 
individuals, who viewed themselves as a social Avant-garde, and adopted 
Islamic and Islamist theories of various trends as a base for their social 
struggle.  
 
The next stage was characterized by massive activity within the existing 
Islamic groups, along with the formation of new Islamic radical groups, 
followed by the publication of new ideologies that did not necessarily 
correspond with Orthodox Islam. Many of these newer ideologies won many 
adherents in the course of the ensuing violent struggle. Thus, there emerged 
ideologues such as Sayyid Qutb, the engineers Shukri Mustafa and Muhammad 
`Abd al-Salam Faraj, and Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Dr. Rifa`i Ahmad Taha 
in Egypt, The Palestinian Dr. `Abdallah Azzam in Afghanistan, and Ossamah 
Bin Ladin in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. In addition there were the 
Palestinian Dr. Fathi Shiqaqi, Omar Muhammad Bakri in London, Dr. Hasan 
al-Turabi in the Sudan, the Tunisian Rashid al-Ghanushi now in exile in 
London, the Syrian Dr. Issam al-`Attar in Germany, and others. Alongside 
them emerged individuals of high Islamic religious education who encouraged 
the new radical Islamic perceptions and gave their counterparts religious 
legitimacy. These included Sheikh Omar `Abd al-Rahman in Egypt, who is 
now serving an American prison sentence, the Egyptian Yousef al-Qardawi 
now in Qatar, Dr. Yousef al-`Azm in Jordan, Fathi Yakan and Sa`id Hawwa in   5
Syria and Lebanon, Muhammad al-Albani in Syria, and the Palestinian As`ad 
Bayyoud al-Tamimi in Jordan.  
 
 
All these processes assisted the Islamist groups in gaining more power and public 
support, and enabled them in some cases to attract certain social elements of protest 
and struggle for human and civil rights. But, there is another very important element to 
note here, mainly in regard to our issue. This is what we may call “Islamic 
atmosphere” created by movements and groups that are not connected to political 
violence or terrorism, and some of them even publicly condemn it or express its 
reservation towards it. Their importance for the issue on stake here lies in two linked 
elements: 
•  These groups and movements carry out the vast majority of political, social, 
cultural and educational Islamic work, both in the Muslim world and among 
Muslim communities in the West. Therefore, they serve as the most important 
element in creating and preserving the “Islamic atmosphere” that is used by 
more extremist and violent Islamist groups. They are in many cases a 
greenhouse for the emergence of violent groups and the preservation of 
worldviews of hostility towards the West or Western culture. 
•  The social, political, cultural, economic, educational and charity infrastructure 
of these movements are the main field of finance for Islamic projects that are 
used also as by product for the finance of violent and terrorist groups, on one 
hand. On the other hand, they are most active in consolidating Muslim 
communities in the West, and therefore set the grounds for massive fund-
raising of militant Islamist groups among these publics.  
 
The Islamic societies, either in the Muslim World or in the West, and the “Islamic 
atmosphere”, even if non-violent, serve therefore a crucial element in the finance of 
Islamist terrorism as well as of social and cultural activity and of charity. Social 
Islamic work is also in many cases part of social protest, either against secular Muslim 
regimes or Western societies, a protest that facilitates the activity of some of the 
Islamist groups. The Islamist “terrorist culture” can be sketched as a pyramid  -- in the 
bottom and base of it there is the large-scale activity of the Islamic non-violent groups, 
associations, institutes, and projects of all kinds. At the head of the pyramid there is 
the radical and terrorist activity. In the middle there are various processes that refine 
certain social elements into hatred, revenge, the search for power and violence. This 
violence is in many cases indirectly financed by innocent elements as a result of 
cultural violent influence.     
 
The Finance of Islamist groups 
The aforementioned factors and long introduction are very important to the 
understanding and explanation of the complexity of the financial and economic system 
of the Islamist groups. To the above-mentioned factors we should add the large and 
significant involvement of Arab and Islamic states in the finance of Islamic activity, 
which is directed not only to social and cultural issues but to terrorism and political 
violence, as well. On one hand, countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan,   6
and Pakistan, grant, directly or through official and unofficial foundations and 
companies, enormous sums of money to most widely range of Islamic movements, 
organizations or groups, or to numerous foundations, associations, institutions, charity 
associations, projects, and institutes all over the world, which often serve as front 
organizations of groups that engage in terrorism too. On the other hand, most of this 
finance feed, deliberately or indirectly, an atmosphere based upon Islamist violent 
perceptions that nourish public support for the phenomenon in general, and various 
groups in particular. Very often, and mainly in the case of Saudi Arabia and Gulf 
States, there are many wealthy individuals who donate a lot of money to Islamic 
movements or projects directly or through private foundations. The finance is private 
but in most cases it comes from officials or individuals of high public position in their 
countries, or member of the royalty, and the finance is therefore perceived as part of 
governmental support.    
 
Additional factor for public support for Islamic movements and groups, including the 
violent ones, is the relatively large confidence that their activists enjoy as men of 
religion or religious authorities in the field of integrity and primarily in finance. Most 
of these groups are generally perceived as dedicating their activity just for public 
interest, and free of corruption. Paradoxes such as the cultivation of narcotic plants 
and selling drugs for the finance of Islamist groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan or 
Lebanon are forgiven in such societies. In these countries this is legitimate 
maintenance, and mainly while the narcotics are used for maintenance and not for 
personal use or distribution among Islamic societies. Some of the Islamic movements 
and groups that actually fight drug dealers and are concerned in the treatment of drug 
addicts, sometimes state in public the permission to distribute drugs among the 
“infidels”, although there is no known Islamic ruling that publicly permits it.    
 
Most of the Islamic and Islamist groups do not engage in criminal activities known 
from non-Islamic terrorist groups in many places over the world, such as robbery of 
banks
5 and property, extortion and criminal threats, taking hostages for ransom, etc. In 
the past three decades there were many cases of kidnapping, hijacking of planes and 
marine vehicles, tourists and government officials, but in order to release Islamist 
prisoners and not to finance terrorist groups. There were cases of robbery of arsenals 
of arms or other kinds of equipments. But, in all of these cases the clean public image 
of the groups that committed these acts, has generally not been damaged. There are 
also no known public or internal religious rulings that permit such acts, although in the 
case of such attacks against non-Muslims they had a kind of ideological legitimacy in 
the framework of “the struggle of self defense against the infidels”.  
 
                                                  
 
5 There were few cases in which Islamist small groups planned to attack banks, not for robbery but in order 
to cause economic damage. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad, for example, planned to attack banks in Egypt 
because they did not follow Islamic Shari`ah. A member of the Egyptian group of Returnees from Albania 
told his investigators that the famous Fatwah of Ibn Taymiyyah against the Tatars applied to the banks. Al- 
Sharq al-Awsat (London), 8 March 1999, p. 10  
On March 1999, members of the group of “returnees from Albania” were accused by the Egyptian 
authorities in planting explosives in front of three Egyptian banks in 1994. Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 9 March 
1999.                                                                                                   7
Few exceptions in this regard were several religious rulings of Sheikhs of terrorist 
small groups, which permitted robbery of non-Muslims for the finance of the group. 
Sheikh Asa`d Bayoud al-Tamimi, one of the religious authorities of the Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad, issued in 1983 a ruling permitting his followers to rob property of 
Jews.
6 Egyptian Islamists of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad admitted in the investigations 
that followed the assassination of the late President Anwar al-Sadat on October 1981, 
that they had robbed jewelry stores owned by Christian Copts in Cairo and Upper 
Egypt, based upon a religious ruling.
7  In the case of the Egyptian Returnees from 
Albania, or “The Arab Balkans”, who were tried in 1999, members of the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad confessed that some members planned while staying in Jordan, Yemen, 
and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, to rob jewelry shops in those countries. Unknown Sheikhs 
issued a special Fatwah for the purpose.
8 It should be noted that they failed to carry 
out the plans because they failed to secure the necessary weapons, had no safe routes 
to escape with the loot, and did not know how to sell the jewelry for cash or how to 
smuggle it. This means that they had no “criminal mind” or linked to any criminal 
circles.  
 
In the investigations that followed the arrest in December 1999, of large group in 
Jordan that was linked to Osamah Bin Laden and his Al-Qa`idah, some of the 
detainees admitted the planning of robbery of Christians in Jordan to finance their 
activity. It was not known whether they had a religious ruling for that.
9 Some Islamists 
were involved in 1999 in the kidnapping of tourists in Northern Yemen for ransom, 
but it appeared as if this activity was part of the widespread phenomenon of 
kidnapping among the Yemenite tribes there. Involvement of terrorism, guerrilla 
warfare, and criminal activity of Islamist groups is widespread in Chechnya and the 
Caucasus, as it was in Bosnia, Albania and Kossovo. But, it seems that it is a result of 
the political and economic culture in those regions, and connected to nationalist 
groups that carry out there a struggle of more national than Islamic nature.  
 
A prominent exception, which is far from the Middle East, is the Islamist radical 
group of Abu Sayyaf in the Southern Philippines, which turned kidnapping of Western 
tourists, Christian missionaries and local businessmen into a thriving industry. This 
group, which split in 1991 from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), has 
raked so far, according to military officials in the Philippines, from ransoms, about 
$5.5 Million. Most of the money is spent on buying arms.
10 The case of the Abu 
Sayyaf group is unique among Islamist groups, and there is a great doubt whether the 
group acts on the basis of religious Islamic rulings, like the MNLF, its father group. 
But, there is an interesting connection between these groups, mainly in recent years – 
their links to Al-Qa`idah and the rising role of the Egyptian and Palestinian Islamists 
both in Afghanistan, and in various other regions connected to the influence of Bin 
                                                  
6 The Fatwah was clandestinely sent from Jordan to the West Bank on audiotape. A private collection of 
the author.                                                                                                                                                       
7 See:  
8 Al-Sharq al-Awsat (London), 8 March 1999.                                                                                                
9 Al-Rai and Al-Dustur (`Amman), 20 April-17 May 2000.                                                                            
10 Manila Times, 7 August 2000.                                                                                                                         8
Laden. It seems that whether they have religious ruling for criminal activity against 
non-Muslims or not, the perception of the global struggle of Al-Qa`idah and the 
Fatwah issued by Bin Laden on February 1998, following the formation of “The 
Islamic International Front for the Jihad against the Jews and the Crusades”, give 
them the legitimacy to commit criminal acts against the “infidels”.
11     
 
Islamic organizations that engage in social and communal activity alongside their 
terrorist one, such as Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Palestinian territories, 
Harakat ul-Ansar in Pakistan, and others, also enjoy public support and sympathy for 
their efficiency in assisting the public. They usually do it better than their 
governments. The most prominent groups in this sense in the Middle East are those 
that belong to the Muslim Brotherhood or their school. The Brotherhood developed a 
comprehensive organizational theory of the formation of an economic infrastructure, 
totally independent. This economic activity is integrated in the religious duties of 
charity, and hence, it is sometimes immune from the attacks of the hostile regime. But, 
this factor is also in many cases, the main cover of such groups for the legitimacy of 
their fund raising, transfer of money and the finance of illegitimate activity, subversive 
or terrorist.   
 
Muslim communities in the West 
A very important element in the field of the finance of Islamist terrorist groups and the 
globalization of Islamist terrorism, which has not yet been sufficiently observed by 
Western countries, is major developments among Muslim communities in the West, 
mainly the growing alienation between many of them and the surrounding Western 
societies. Hatred of foreigners in the major countries in Europe, poverty and 
unemployment, difficulties in coping with Western modernization and values, clash of 
values and cultures, and disintegration of family values, brought about a growing 
significant social and political activity of Islamist activists among them. Islamic social 
and welfare movements, which are not part of the radical trend, help in creating the 
Islamic atmosphere that directly and indirectly assists the radicals too, and mainly in 
fund raising, recruitment of supporters and members, establishing all kinds of 
institutions, and distributing different kinds of publications. Above all they attempt at 
planting in growing Muslim societies in the West the perception of viewing Western 
culture as the enemy - the party of the devil (Hizb al-Shaytan) contrary to the true 
believers - the party of God (Hizballah).  
 
An important experience of the consolidation of Muslim community has been led by 
the Pakistani Dr. Kalim Siddiqui, who lived for many years in London and directed 
the Islamic cultural center of the pro-Iranian circles there. Siddiqui, who was one of 
the first Islamic ideologues to talk about the globalization of the Islamic struggle, was 
behind the theory of the “Non-territorial Islamic State”. In the framework of this 
ideology he established in the 1980s the Muslim Parliament of the UK, in an attempt 
to create an Islamic body to represent all the different groups of the Muslims in the 
UK, who originated from many Muslim countries of various Islamic sub-cultures and 
                                                  
11 For an interesting analysis of this Fatwah see: Magnus Ranstorp, Interpreting the broader context and    
meaning of Bin-Laden Fatwah, Studies in Conflict Terrorism, Vol. 21, Oct.-Dec. 1998.                                 9
trends. He viewed the Muslim parliament not only as the minority political system for 
Muslims in Britain. The parliament was meant to be first of all the base for the “Non-
territorial Islamic State”. The key word for him was power – the State was the 
instrument by which a community could exercise its collective power in action.
12    
 
In many cases Islamist activists influence on parts of Muslim publics whose religious 
knowledge is poor. As a consequence of social pressures they tend to adopt motives 
that sometimes lack religious rules or norms and emphasize the social and political 
confrontation. The radical perception of Jihad is therefore more attractive and appeal 
to many of them. According to press reports quoting court papers of US prosecutors, 
this element has been used by Bin Laden through international companies and relief 
organizations that were front organizations, and recruited through them US residences 
communicating with them by fax, satellite phones and coded letters.
13  
 
A good recent example for the use of Muslim communities in the West is the story of 
the Algerian Ahmad Rassam who was arrested on December 14 1999, in the US- 
Canadian border with explosives. His arrest and following arrests in the US and 
Canada, uncovered a plot to carry out terrorist operations in different places in the US, 
on the occasion of the Millennium by the Algerian Islamist group GIA. American 
investigators linked this plot to Bin Laden and his global struggle. Rassam was part of 
the growing Algerian community in Montreal, where according to press reports 
“people seeking refugee status can drop from sight despite arrest warrants and 
deportation orders”. He entered Canada in 1994 with a forged French passport and 
applied for refuge, claiming he fled from torture and persecution. He did not show up 
to the hearing on his refugee claim and was therefore denied. He was arrested in 
August 1995 upon an order of deportation, but was released after a month and was 
asked to arrange his status with the immigration authorities, which he failed to do. 
Only in May 1998 immigration officials issued an arrest warrant for him, but he was 
not found. In June 1998 he was arrested for theft but was not demanded by the 
immigration authorities and disappeared among the 30,000 Algerians living in 
Montreal.
14 
 
Statistics and data published by various bodies of the United Nations show a growing 
number of people from Muslim countries that seek refuge and asylum, mainly in 
Germany (40%), the UK, the Netherlands and France. The number of Algerians 
seeking refuge or political asylum in Europe in the years 1990-1993 for example 
increased from 1600 to 14,000 per year.
15 In February 1998, the German Minister of 
Interior decided a temporary ban on the deportation of Algerians in response to the 
upsurge in violence in Algeria. An estimated 6,500 rejected Algerian asylum seekers 
remained in Germany in 1998. The number of first-time asylum seekers in Germany in 
                                                  
12   For a good account of Kalim Siddiqui’s views in this respect, see: “Kalim Siddiqui’s vision of a minority 
political system and a non-territorial Islamic state”, by his successor in office Iqbal Siddiqui. 
http://muslimedia.com/archives/special-edition/ks-thought/ksthot3.htm  
13   The New York Times, 23 January 2000. 
14   Associated Press, 23 December 1999. www.bouldernews.com/news/worldnation/23atterr2.html  
15   "Background paper on refugees and asylum seekers from Algeria", UNCHR, Center for Documentation 
and Research, Geneva, 1995.  www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/cdr/cdrdza.htm   10
1998 was 143,429, most of them from Muslim countries including Bosnia and 
Albania. It was a decrease from 1992 numbers – 438,191 – but in general the number 
of Muslim immigrants to Germany itself was over one Million people.
16 The major 
violent events in the 1990s – The Gulf war, Iraqi war against its Kurds, Bosnia, 
Albania, Kossovo, Afghanistan, Algeria, Chechnya, and elsewhere, brought waves of 
Muslim immigrants to West European countries, seeking refuge, political asylum and 
work. This is beside “regular” immigrants, many of them illegally that do not appear 
in the official statistics. The UK faced in the second half of the 1990s a significant 
increase of asylum seekers and refugees, who made the government announce on July 
1998 an administrative reform to clear “the huge backlog of asylum applications in a 
parliamentary White Paper called “Fairer, Faster, Firmer – a modern approach to 
immigration and asylum”.
17   
 
Muslim immigrants to the US are minority among the enormous number of 
immigrants from all over the world, but the statistics published by both the US and the 
UN show a significant increase in the past decade. The US is very active in seeking 
solutions by resettlement of refugees from areas of risk in other countries, but had 
during the 1990s to increase the admission of refugees in the US as well.
18 Statistics of 
political asylum cases approved by immigration judges in the US between 1989-1999 
shows that only 22.4% of the applications were approved. But, in the case of Muslim 
countries, such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, Iran, and Iraq, the majority of 
the applications were approved.
19  
 
The increasing number of Muslim immigrants to Europe and the US was a result of 
the political violence in Muslim countries in the 1990s. In many cases those 
immigrants and asylum seekers were actively involved in violent events and may be 
easily affected by extreme radical Islamist ideas.  
 
In most cases the long-term goals of many radical groups are vague. They tend to 
speak in terms of an eternal global mission in accordance with the basics of orthodox 
Islam, whose victory, even though according to their belief is secured it is going to 
become true only in the far future. They also lack normal political observance, and 
therefore they are not pragmatic except for in case they are confronted by force, like 
what happened in the second half of the 1990s. When Arab regimes started to fight the 
Islamists by force, we have witnessed the start of a move from terrorist groups to the 
demand to become legitimate political movements and parties. It happened during 
                                                  
16   Worldwide Refugee Information, Country Report: Germany 1999.      
www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/europe/germany.htm  
See also: Steven Edminster, "Recklessly Risking Lives: restrictive interpretations of "agents of persecution" 
in Germany and France", Worldwide Refugee Information, 1999. 
www.refugees.org/world/articles/wrs99_agentspersecution.htm   
17   Worldwide Refugee Information, Country Report: United Kingdom, 2000.  
www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/europe/united_kingdom.htm   
18   Worldwide Refugee Information, UNHCR, "US government gear up to double refugee admissions from 
the Middle East and South Asia", December 1999. www.refugees.org/world/articles/unhcr_rr99_11.htm   
19   Asylum Cases decided by Immigration judges approved or denied, by selected country of origin, 2000. 
www.refugees.org/world/statistics/wrs00_table3.htm           11
1998-99 in Egypt, Algeria, the Yemen, and partially affected the relations between 
Hamas and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). A very important element in 
this regard was the significant decline of public support for these groups in their 
homelands, as a result of their murderous operations, mainly in Algeria and the 
operation in Luxor in Egypt on November 1997, which shocked the Egyptian public 
and the Islamic establishment. But, this process was also part of the shift of Islamist 
terrorism to globalization. Islamist groups started targeting the growing Muslim 
communities in the West in order to seek support.    
 
A crucial element in the 1990s and if we look at the near future, is the massive fund 
raising for all kinds of Islamic activity in Europe and the US. In many cases the money 
is spent on social and cultural projects, either for the benefit of Muslim population in 
the West or in the Arab countries. But part of it is raised by various radical Islamist 
groups or by front organizations and institutions established by them. US officials 
reported that they have discovered during investigations that a significant number of 
Islamic terrorists were concealing their activities and sources of funds by using 
charitable organizations as fronts. Many of these charities do substantial community 
service work. Such investigations are not easy and can raise allegations of targeting 
religious or ethnic groups.
20      
 
An Algerian immigrant to Canada who was writing a doctoral thesis on Islamic groups 
claimed that Canada has served as a transit point for much of the $137 Million raised 
worldwide for the Islamic movements in Algeria. He found that GIA was using tactics 
ranging from special taxes to outright extortion to raise money funneled through 
Canada. The group had only little support among the Algerians in Montreal, but 
exploited the freedom under the Canadian Rights Charter to operate in that country.
21  
 
The Means of Finance  
 
The means of financing terrorist groups in the Middle East vary from direct transfer of 
cash money to terrorist groups with special couriers
22, through the transfer by variety 
of legitimate bank accounts, to the finance of a large range of associations, 
institutions, institutes, and various kinds of social and educational projects, hospitals, 
orphans and other humanitarian goals.   
 
The money is transferred to the Arab or Muslim World by sophisticated and secret, but 
in most cases legitimate, transactions, through bank accounts in Europe, the US and 
the Middle East. Some of the Islamic institutions in the West are used also to money 
laundry of big sums of money transferred from different countries or wealthy 
individuals in them, primarily Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf states. 
                                                  
20   ERRI daily intelligence report, 17 February 2000, Vol. 6-48. www.emergency.com/1999/bnldn-pg.htm  
21   The Daily Camera, 23 December 1999. www.bouldernews.com/news/worldnation/23atterr2.html  
22 For example, in two cases on 1990 and December 1992, a special courier arrived at Israel with suitcases 
of 100,000 US$ each, in order to give the money to Hamas activists. In his interrogation and trial he        
confessed that the money was aimed at the reorganization of the terrorist activity of the movement. But, it 
should be noted that the money was transferred for the terrorist activity and not for the social one. It might 
mean that in the case of Hamas, there was total separation between the two fields of activity.            12
During the 1990s this transfer of money has gradually increased, after the Gulf States 
stopped to finance the PLO because of its position in the Gulf war, and moved their 
financial support to Islamic groups, organizations and projects. This element brought 
about the foundation of many kinds of institutions, cultural centers, publications, 
research institutes and welfare associations that one of their main goals was fund 
raising and money laundry, beside their use for the spread of radical Islamist messages 
among Muslim populations in the West.  
 
The finance of social projects among Muslim societies in the Middle East and in the 
1990s in the Balkans, and in Central and Southern Asia is a controversial issue in 
many cases. The Saudi example is this case is the most controversial.  On one hand, 
the Saudi government is the greatest financier of Muslim relief organizations all over 
the world. But, on the other hand, by doing so in certain areas it directly assists publics 
that support terrorist Islamist groups and indirectly assists these groups. There is lot of 
reports on one of the Saudi official relief organizations – IIRO, The International 
Islamic Relief Organization – as if it provides financial support to Wahhabi groups in 
the Middle East and Central Asia. Other recent reports even connect IIRO with Bin 
Laden, although the information does not seem reliable.
23 According to IIRO 
publication in its website, the organization granted in the period 1987-1995 418 
Million US$, 140 of them (33.4%) to “special projects”.
24 These special projects are 
not detailed, unlike other issues such as education, health, social welfare, or goods 
donation. It does not mean that IIRO is financing terrorism, but part of their projects 
finance various kind of matters that indirectly serve terrorist groups and the support 
for them. The IIRO is connected to the Saudi governmental organization of the 
Muslim World League (MWL), the biggest Islamic relief organization on earth, which 
has over 100 branches in more than 30 countries.
25 The organization, and the biggest 
Kuwaiti Islamic Relief organization, has often been accused of financing Islamist 
terrorist groups by Arab governments, Egypt in particular.  
 
The issue of the finance of Islamist terrorism was raised in the last years mainly in 
regard to Osamah Bin Laden, who appears in many documents, press reports and 
probably intelligence reports as the wealthiest financier of terrorism nowadays. On 
April 2000, the British Times published a report from British intelligence sources, on 
an investigation of the British security agencies due to reports that Bin Laden “has 
been funding young British Muslims at armed training camps, and that “military 
Islamic groups” recruited and sent 200 British youngsters to desert camps in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan, and the Sudan”. Some of them took part in battles and were killed.
26  
 
The real wealth of Bin Laden is not publicly known, and the range of his wealth as 
reported by the Media is between millions to billions of $US. His family, which owns 
in Saudi Arabia an empire of business companies in the field of constructions, is really 
very wealthy. But, the Saudi authorities deported Bin Laden in 1994, and since then he 
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found refuge in the Sudan and since 1996 in Afghanistan. There is no reliable 
information about his real fortune and how much of it is invested in terrorist 
operations. Besides, he is residing in the past two years since the terrorist explosions 
in the American embassies in East Africa on August 1998, in a limited area in 
Afghanistan. Although he is secured by the patronage of the Talebani regime in 
Afghanistan, we may assume that his ability to run business from there is very limited 
if at all possible. According to American intelligence reports Bin Laden is also 
suffering from several diseases in his bones and kidneys, and is supposed to be 
replaced in the near future by Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad group.
27  Other reports are claiming that Bin Laden is even going to die 
from liver disease.  
 
In fact, at least the case of the Jordanian group that was arrested on December 1999, 
and suspected by the Jordanian authorities to be linked to him, may raise doubts as to 
his finance of terrorist groups linked to him. In their confessions, as brought to court 
and published in the Jordanian press, they admitted in planning robbery in order to 
finance their activity, and in receiving very small sums of money from abroad, no 
more than 2000 $US.
28 It may prove that Bin Laden did not finance them and that the 
reports about his finance of terrorist groups and operations are far from reality. In a 
case of Palestinian Islamist group uncovered by Israeli security service in April-June 
2000, and whose leader was linked to Bin Laden, the story repeated itself. Most of 
their finance came from Hamas sources.  In an investigation in the United States of 
alleged Bin Laden network in 1999, about 11,000 US$ were sent from the US to an 
Islamist activist linked to Bin Laden in the Middle East, and not the way it was 
supposed in a terrorist network financed by Bin Laden.
29 
 
In general, the issue of the finance of Islamist terrorism looks sometimes exaggerated 
in the Media or in the use of politicians. This is a very difficult issue to research 
relying on open sources. But it seems that the vast majority of the money raised by 
Islamic movements, groups and organizations is spent on their social and welfare 
activity, rather than on direct terrorism. But, taking into consideration the afore- 
mentioned pyramid of Islamic activity, the terrorist Islamist groups and mainly global 
Islamist networks, indirectly enjoy a lot of support by this process of fund raising. 
 
This last process has started to decline in the past two years in the US, as a result of 
legislation and federal investigations, mainly in the case of the Palestinian Islamist 
groups of Hamas and PIJ. But none of the American steps has been so far taken in any 
of the European countries, which continue to be an ideal greenhouse for Islamist 
radical activity, and above all the UK. The countering of this kind of terrorism, even 
by legislation and other non-violent means, and above all Western cooperation, is 
crucial for the fight against Islamist radical terrorism, and if European countries join 
the US in this field it could lead to the decline of at least the massive fund raising.  
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British authorities took their first real move in this field just lately in January 2000. 
The British Charities Commission issued a ruling that stripped a charity associated 
with the Muslim Cultural Society of its tax-exempt status, and declared that the 
organization could no longer be called a charity. Sheikh Omar Muhammad Bakri, an 
ex-Tahrir activist who heads a group called Al-Muhajiroun and a known activist in the 
Islamic circles in the UK, directed the charity. British press reports claimed also that 
he was also the head of the political wing of the Islamic Political Front (IPF), which 
has sent British volunteers to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya. The 
military wing of the IPF was allegedly founded by Bin Laden.
30 
 
A good example for the real goals of various Islamist institutions and centers that were 
established in the US and Europe in the last decade, is an internal document written in 
the early 1990s by activists of one of the most radical Middle Eastern Islamist groups: 
the pro-Iranian Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The document sets forth a comprehensive 
plan to establish a hostile intelligence organization in the US and elsewhere. Among 
other things it states, “Our presence in North America gives us a unique opportunity to 
monitor, explore and follow-up… We are in the center that leads the conspiracy 
against our Islamic world. Therefore, here we can monitor and watch the American 
policies and the activities of those questionable organizations, and establish a center 
for studies, intelligence and information”. Part of the activities of this “center for 
studies” is “military training programs, benefiting from the available opportunities that 
exist in this country”.
31 This institute is a subject of investigation by US authorities for 
the past five years.  
 
Conclusion: Targeting the finance of terrorist groups 
The most important elements in the financing of Islamist terrorist groups are the public 
support of Islamic societies and communities in the Middle East or elsewhere in the 
Muslim World, or in the West, for the socio-political messages and interpretations 
presented by these groups in religious cover. The social element is important in the 
financing of these groups, since the social, welfare, charity, and relief activity is an 
essential element in the consolidation of communities that support such groups.  
 
Even in cases where Islamic societies or parts of them, do not support terrorism per ce, 
in many cases they support the atmosphere of anti-Western or anti-Jewish messages of 
Islamist terrorist groups. This factor is vital in the ability of terrorist groups in the 
Middle East, or Middle Eastern terrorist groups elsewhere, to raise funds, launder 
money through legitimate institutions, and maintain financial facilities.   
 
Among Muslim communities in the West there was a social change in the past decade 
or two. The first generation of immigrants sought to merge into Western society and 
was much occupied with economic difficulties. The expectations of the second and 
third generations of immigrants were in many cases unfulfilled, reinforcing their 
alienation from the Western societies that surround them. Although in many countries, 
primarily the United Kingdom, Scandinavia and Germany, they were granted generous 
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economic support, as well as freedom of speech and activity, organization and 
education, there was a flood of financial support from the wealthier Muslim countries 
that assisted them in building and promoting their own communities. The Westerners’ 
resentment of foreigners in their midst, and the ongoing difficulties of coping with 
modernization, unemployment and traditional culture, allowed a wide range of Islamic 
infrastructure to thrive in the Western democratic system, which could serve as a most 
suitable greenhouse for Islamist movements and groups and their financing. A variety 
of associations in London, or research institutes in the United States, for example, 
could serve as the backbone of terrorist Islamist groups for diverse goals: recruitment, 
fund-raising, publications, communications and so on. This element seems to reinforce 
the internationalization of Islamist terrorism in the Middle East or Asia. Thus, the 
growing feeling of alienation among Muslim youth is perhaps the most important 
factor in analyzing the prospects of future Islamist terrorism in general, and the 
financing of terrorist groups in particular.  
 
The list of Middle Eastern and Asian Islamic relief organizations is enormous, and 
most of them are active in Western countries, where the supervision over them is very 
difficult under democratic laws. Most of them have very active Internet websites to 
promote their activity, primarily among Muslim communities in the West. There have 
been just few cases in which governments or security services succeeded in proving 
the link between such funds or associations to terrorist activity.  In most cases there 
were investigations that led to no results. Foundations like Interpal in the UK, Holy 
Land Foundation in Texas, USA, Al-Aqsa Foundation in Germany, and others, were 
subject of investigation without any real success. One reason for the lack of success 
was non-sufficient cooperation and different views on how to deal with terrorism in 
general, and with this kind of religious terrorism in particular. These differences exist 
between Western countries, mainly the European Commonwealth and the United 
States, or between Arab and Middle Eastern countries. The disputes in the Arab world 
are crucial for countering the financing of Islamist terrorist groups, since a major part 
of the financing comes indirectly from Arab governments, institutions or wealthy 
individuals. The issue of financing Islamist terrorist groups was in some cases a source 
of accusations of Arab governments toward other Arab states. A good example was 
accusations made by the Egyptian government against Kuwait.
32  
 
In the last years there have been several initiatives on the international or national 
fields to block the funding of Islamist groups. In his testimony before the International 
Relations Committee of the US House of Representatives in July 2000, Ambassador 
Michael Sheehan, Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism in the US State Department, has 
stated:  
“One of the most important ways to combat terrorism is to disrupt the 
financing of terrorist groups and activities… The ability of terrorists operating 
in Afghanistan, for example, to obtain funds and other material support is a 
symptom of the other primary trend in terrorism: the shift from terrorist groups 
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sponsored by states to international networks of terrorists not affiliated with 
particular governments.”
33  
 
On 9 December 1999, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
34 on 
the initiative of France. So far, only 25 countries have signed the convention and no 
one has ratified it
35. The last one to sign so far was India, this month. But, the 
convention could come into force only after 23 countries ratify it. This situation 
reflects the main obstacle for targeting the financing of terrorism: the absence of real 
international cooperation. This is not new, but the decline of sponsoring terrorism by 
states should make this cooperation easier to achieve, since national political interests 
and considerations towards certain states no longer exist. Countries like Russia, India, 
and China, joined the Western countries that for years suffer from Islamist terrorism, 
in the call for better cooperation, but the real advance in cooperation is still very slow.  
 
Where lies the problem, and what is the main obstacle?  
 
The “ordinary” obstacle lies in the different interests of different countries, suspicion, 
and competition in their relationships with Muslim countries, which are all natural 
factors in international relations. In the case of the war in Bosnia, Albania, and 
Kossovo, the Muslim rebels were the “good guys” and the Serbians were the bad ones. 
In the case of Chechnya, the “bad guys” are the Islamic rebels who are assisted by a 
battalion of “Arab Afghans” that are accused in relations to Bin Laden.  
 
But the main obstacle is found in the failure to deal with internal socio-political 
problems. This paper cannot enter the so wide field of analyzing the solutions for the 
socio-economic problems of Muslim communities in the West or Muslim societies in 
the Middle East. But, in the narrow field of countering the financing of terrorist groups 
there should be first of all better understanding of the importance of the role of Islamic 
infrastructures as the main source of financial support for Islamist terrorist groups. 
Much better supervision on such infrastructures does not necessarily means fighting 
Islam, even though Muslim communities and countries would like to present it. Such 
supervision must be accompanied not only by international conventions, but also by 
national and coordinated one, in different Western and Middle Eastern countries. 
Means, such as the United States has started to legislate since 1996, should be imitated 
by other countries and parliaments, and such a legislation could bring better 
cooperation.  
 
Last but not least, is the cooperation between countries in the field of intelligence. 
Information about institutes and associations that serve as financing bases for terrorist 
groups should be exchanged between polices and security services, and not only in the 
case of planning of terrorist operations but on a regular basis. The globalization of 
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Islamist terrorist networks should be followed by the globalization of cooperation in 
countering them.  
  
  